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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Shane A. Kraly appeals from his judgment of conviction for rape, injury to a 
child, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of paraphernalia.  He claims 
the jury verdict for count II, injury to a child, is unsupported by sufficient evidence. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Kraly and M.M. met on Facebook.  (Tr., p. 145, L. 21 – p. 147, L. 21.)  M.M., 
who was 17, told Kraly she was 19.  (Tr., p. 149, Ls. 17-24.)  Kraly, who was 30, told 
M.M. he was 25.  (Tr., p. 149, L. 25 – p. 150, L. 1; p. 381, Ls. 6-11.)  After exchanging 
text messages they agreed that Kraly would come over and spend the night and they 
would have sex.  (Tr., p. 156, p. 20 – p. 159, p. 17.) 
 Kraly drove to M.M.’s residence that evening.  (Tr., p. 165, Ls. 1-13; p. 167, Ls. 
1-5.)  M.M. lived with her father, but her bedroom was in a separate building on the 
property, not connected to the main house.  (Tr., p, 167, Ls. 1-22; p. 169, Ls. 4-10.) 
 After some small talk in her room, Kraly asked M.M. whether she wanted to use 
meth.  (Tr., p. 170, Ls. 1-6; p. 172, Ls. 2-8.)  She testified that she “kind of freaked out,” 
and responded “like, ‘No not really.’”  (Tr., p. 172, Ls. 9-10.)  M.M. testified that she did 
not “accept that offer” to do meth “and chill together,” and that she had not done meth 
before.  (Tr., p. 172, Ls. 19-22.)  Following this exchange, Kraly sat on top of M.M. and 
gave her a backrub.  (Tr., p. 176, Ls. 10-23.)  Kraly then put a syringe without a needle 
into M.M.’s anus and injected her with methamphetamine.  (Tr., p. 177, L. 8 – p. 179, L. 
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4.)  As Kraly did this he told M.M. what he was doing, and told her “what to do once the 
syringe” was inserted.  (Tr., p. 178, L. 21 – p. 179, L. 12.) 
M.M. testified that after she was injected with methamphetamine her head hurt 
“really bad” and she “didn’t care” about her surroundings.  (Tr., p. 180, Ls. 3-25.)  She 
testified that she was “really tired and confused.”  (Tr., p. 182, Ls. 14-15.)  Kraly told her 
“to like trust him and it won’t hurt,” and, using the same needle he had just injected 
himself with, injected M.M. with more methamphetamine in the arm. (Tr., p. 182, L. 2 – 
p. 183, L. 7.)  Throughout the night Kraly repeatedly injected M.M. with 
methamphetamine (Tr., p. 187, Ls. 4-25) and the two had sex until the following morning  
(See Tr., pp. 183-94). 
 That morning, M.M. was still high and “didn’t want to go to school.”  (Tr., p. 194, 
Ls. 17-23.)  Kraly drove them to a store for coffee and cigarettes, then drove them to the 
River Inn casino.  (Tr., p. 195, L. 3 – p. 196, L. 2.)  Shortly after arriving at the casino 
they left and drove to a secluded location off the side of the road.  (Tr., p. 196, Ls. 4-12.)  
While there, and while still in the truck, Kraly again injected M.M. with 
methamphetamine in her arm.  (Tr., p. 200, Ls. 19-24; p. 206, Ls. 6-21.)  Kraly and M.M. 
then drove back to the casino and “literally just sat” in the truck.  (Tr., p. 207, Ls. 8-12.)   
As it happened, during this entire encounter M.M. was wearing an ankle monitor 
per the terms of a juvenile-court release order.   (Tr., p. 156, Ls. 20-22; p. 301, L. 22 – p. 
302, L. 3.)  Using the ankle monitor’s GPS coordinates, law enforcement tracked M.M. to 
the parking lot and discovered her and Kraly in his truck.  (Tr., p. 299, Ls. 17-20; p. 300, 
Ls. 12-18; pp. 304-18.)  Kraly was arrested and charged with rape, injury to a child, 
possession of methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp. 196-
--
  3 
200.)  After trial, the jury found Kraly guilty of all counts, and he admitted to a persistent 
violator enhancement.  (Tr., p. 528, L. 13 – p. 529, L. 6.) 
The district court sentenced Kraly to concurrent 15-year sentences on the rape and 
injury to child charges, fixing five years.  (R., pp. 276-79.)  Kraly was also sentenced to a 
concurrent five-year fixed sentence on the methamphetamine charge and received credit 
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ISSUE 
 
Kraly states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Is there sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict on the Injury to 
Child count given the absence of any evidence that M.M. was in the “care 
or custody” of Mr. Kraly? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Kraly failed to show there was not substantial evidence from which the jury could 
conclude M.M. was in Kraly’s care or custody? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Kraly Has Failed To Show There Was Insufficient Evidence From Which The Jury Could 
Have Concluded M.M. Was In His Care Or Custody 
 
A. Introduction 
 Kraly contends on appeal there was insufficient evidence from which the jury 
could have concluded M.M. was in his care or custody when he injected her with 
methamphetamine.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-7.)  Therefore, he argues, the state presented 
insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for injury to a child.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 
5-7.) 
 But “care or custody”—in the context of Idaho Code Section 18-1501(1)—means 
more than formal, parent-child custody.  Interpreting the “care or custody” phrase, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has looked to, among other things, whether the defendant 
controlled or supervised the minor.  See Beers v. Corp. of the President of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 316 P.3d 92 (2013).  And other 
jurisdictions have found that defendants with minor children in their vehicles have 
control or custody over those children.  See, e.g., State v. Anspach, 627 N.W.2d 227 
(Iowa 2001). 
Construing the facts and inferences to uphold the jury verdict, because the 
evidence showed that Kraly had control over M.M. when injected her with 
methamphetamine in her bedroom and inside his vehicle, there was substantial evidence 
from which the jury could have concluded M.M. was in Kraly’s care or custody. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Idaho’s appellate courts “will not overturn a judgment of conviction, entered upon 
a jury verdict, where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact 
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 
P.3d 387, 389 (2007) (citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003)).  
Reviewing courts therefore view evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
and we do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury regarding the credibility of the 
witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence.”  Oliver, 144 Idaho at 724, 170 P.3d at 387; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 
822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 
(Ct. App. 1987).  The facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are therefore 
construed in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict.  See Oliver, 144 Idaho at 724, 170 P.3d 
at 387; see also Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072.  Consequently, “[w]here there 
is competent although conflicting evidence to sustain the verdict, this court cannot 
reweigh that evidence or disturb the verdict.”  State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 644-45, 
962 P.2d 1026, 1028-29 (2002); State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 684, 99 P.3d 1069, 1074 
(2004). 
 
C. Kraly Was Exerting Control Over M.M. When He Injected Her With 
Methamphetamine In Her Bedroom And In His Vehicle; This Was Substantial 
Evidence From Which The Jury Could Conclude She Was In His Custody 
 
 As set forth in the Idaho Code, 
 
[a]ny person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce 
great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, 
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or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or 
having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the 
person or health of such child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits 
such child to be placed in such situation that its person or health is 
endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not 
exceeding one (1) year, or in the state prison for not less than one (1) year 
nor more than ten (10) years. 
 
I.C. § 18-1501(1) (emphasis added).  The central issue in this case is what it means to 
“have[] the care or custody of any child.” 
 The Idaho Court of Appeals has construed “care or custody” by looking to its 
“ordinary meaning … and the context in which it is used”: 
“Care” is defined as “CHARGE, SUPERVISION, MANAGEMENT: 
responsibility for or attention to safety and well-being.”  WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 338 (1993). See also 
People v. Culuko, 78 Cal.App.4th 307, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 808 (2000) 
(holding that there is “‘no special meaning to the terms “care and custody” 
beyond the plain meaning of the terms themselves. The terms “care or 
custody” do not imply a familial relationship but only a willingness to 
assume duties correspondent to the role of a caregiver.’”) [citations 
omitted]. 
 
State v. Morales, 146 Idaho 264, 267, 192 P.3d 1088, 1091 (Ct. App. 2008).  Thus, where 
an uncle lived with his nephew, “admitted to watching the children” from time to time, 
took the nephew to the hospital on a prior occasion, and took the nephew to the hospital 
for the abusive injuries at issue, the jury could have found that the child “was in 
Morales’s care.”  Id. 
 The Idaho Supreme Court has similarly made clear that “having the care or 
custody of any child” does not simply refer to a parent-child relationship or other formal 
legal custody.  In Beers v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 316 P.3d 92 (2013), the Court examined “care or custody” as 
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part of a larger inquiry into the plaintiffs’ civil suit against the church and various 
individual Ward members.   
Heidi Beers was a teenager who participated in a church-organized campout.  Id. 
at 683, 316 P.3d at 95.  Heidi’s parents did not attend, but they allowed her to ride up to 
the campout with a friend.  Id.  After Heidi arrived she and approximately 20 other 
children went with Bradley Day, a supervising adult, to a bridge.  Id.  Day had promised 
the children he would take them there if they had their parent’s permission.  Id.  That 
evening, several children jumped from the bridge to the river below, but Heidi did not.  
Id. 
Heidi returned to the bridge the next day.  Id.  Two adults were present, one of 
whom, Garrett Haueter, “told everyone to jump in the location that had been checked” for 
rocks and obstructions.  Id. at 684, 316 P.2d at 96.  The other adult, Sharolyn Ririe, 
admitted to Heidi that she herself would “be afraid to jump” due to a fear of heights.  Id.  
Heidi was likewise afraid; but she worked up the courage and jumped anyway.  Id.  Heidi 
jumped in an area that had not been inspected and fractured her ankle when she hit the 
water.  Id.  
 Heidi and her parents sued the church and several individual defendants for 
negligence.  Id.  A threshold question was “whether the [church] or the Ward members 
owed a duty” toward Heidi.  Id. at 685, 316 P.2d at 97.  The Court concluded there were 
two potential bases for finding “an affirmative duty of care”: 1) a special relationship 
between the individual defendants and Heidi, or 2) an assumed duty towards Heidi.  Id. at 
686, 316 P.2d at 98. 
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 The Court affirmed the district court’s finding that there was no special 
relationship between Heidi and the individual defendants: 
As explained above, a special relationship requires a right and an ability to 
control the conduct of the third party. There is no evidence that the Ward 
members had such a relationship with Heidi.  None of the nine individual 
Respondents can be said to have had custody of Heidi at any time during 
the campout, let alone at the time of her injury.  Heidi’s parents did not 
speak to anyone regarding her attendance at the Ward campout.  When 
Heidi decided to go down to the bridge, she did so without seeking or 
obtaining permission from any of the individual Ward members. The facts 
do not demonstrate that any of the Ward members exercised the level of 
control over Heidi that would justify imposing a duty based on a special 
relationship. Thus, the district court properly determined that the Ward 
members did not owe Heidi a duty because there was no special 
relationship. 
 
Id. at 689, 316 P.2d at 101. 
 
 The Court then looked to whether any of the actions of the individual defendants 
“may have given rise to an assumed duty to Heidi.”  Id. at 689-90, 316 P.2d at 101-02.  
The Court found there was no assumed duty, first because most of the defendants were 
“not present at the bridge when Heidi was injured,” or in one case had nothing to do with 
the bridge jumping.  Id.  Those defendants had therefore not assumed a duty.  Id.  As for 
Bradley Day, who took the children to the bridge the prior evening, the “duty to act is 
limited to the discrete episode in which the aid is rendered,” and would not have extended 
to the following day.  Id. at 690, 316 P.2d at 102.  Sharolyn Ririe, who admitted her own 
fears of jumping, and who asked some of the children if they had checked for rocks, did 
not assume a duty, insofar as there was no “reasonable inference that Sharolyn Ririe was 
supervising the bridge jumping in general, or Heidi in particular, much less that Heidi 
could reasonably rely upon her supervision.”  Id. at 689, 316 P.2d at 101.  Lastly, even 
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Garrett Haueter, who was the most involved person “present at the bridge when Heidi 
was injured,” had not assumed a duty: 
He testified that he witnessed some of the youths check the water for 
hazards as well as for depth.  He also warned the jumpers that only a 
specific area under the bridge had been inspected.  Of all the defendants, 
Garrett Haueter had the most active role on the bridge when Heidi was 
injured. However, the district court found that his actions did not rise to 
the level of undertaking supervision.  The district court stated that “Garrett 
relayed information about where the river had been inspected.  He never 
personally inspected the area nor did he direct the inspection of the area.  
Furthermore, there is no indication that he exercised control over where 
the jumpers actually jumped.” 
 
Id. at 690, 316 P.2d at 102 (emphasis added).  The Court concluded that “[i]ndicating 
where the bridge and river had been inspected did not constitute assumption of the duty to 
direct, control, supervise, or prevent any person from jumping from the bridge.”  Id.   
Accordingly, “Garrett Haueter did not assume a duty to Heidi.”  Id. 
The Court next considered whether the defendants had committed “civil child 
abuse.”  Id. at 685, 690-92, 316 P.2d at 96, 102-04.  This related inquiry arose because 
Heidi had also sued under I.C. § 6-1701, which incorporates the criminal injury to child 
statute as a civil action.  See id. at 691, 316 P.2d at 103.  Thus, to determine whether the 
individuals had violated the “civil child abuse” statute, the court looked to I.C. § 18-
1501(2) and analyzed whether Heidi was in the defendants’ “care or custody.”  Id. at 691-
92, 316 P.2d 103-04. 
Referring back to its analysis of the duties owed by the individual defendants, the 
Court held that none of the defendants had the “care or custody” of Heidi: 
…[R]elying on the broad definition of “willfully,” [the Beers’s] theory is 
that the Ward members willfully caused or permitted Heidi to be injured or 
to be placed in such situation that her health was endangered.  The 
difficulty for the Beerses is that the statute does not impose a duty upon 
----
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the general public to act in such a way as to protect children from injury or 
exposure to dangerous conditions. Under the plain text of the statute, this 
duty only extends to those “having the care or custody of [the] child.” As 
previously discussed, none of the Ward members had “the care or custody 
of” Heidi.  
 
Id. at 692, 316 P.2d at 104 (emphasis added).  Because the Court previously found no 
special relationship or assumed duty, there was likewise no “care or custody” at issue, and 
I.C. § 18-1501(2) likewise “imposed no duties.”  Id. 
 Applying these standards here, there was substantial evidence that Kraly had 
custody over M.M, insofar as he was exerting his control over M.M., and control over the 
situation.  M.M. testified that, when asked whether she wanted to do crystal meth, she 
“kind of freaked out,” and “was like, ‘No, not really.’” (Tr., p. 172, Ls. 7-12.)  When 
asked whether she accepted his “offer” to “use[] it with him” and “just like chill 
together,” she testified she did not accept his offer.  (Tr., p. 172, Ls. 13-20.)  When asked 
whether she had “done crystal meth before then,” M.M. testified she had not.  (Tr., p. 
172, Ls. 21-22.)  M.M. further testified that needles “terrify the crap out of me” and that 
she hated them.  (Tr., p. 173, Ls. 6-8.) 
 When Kraly injected M.M. with methamphetamine he was exerting control over 
her in several senses.  He injected her despite her expressed reservations: she testified that 
she told him “no,” she did not really want to do meth, and that she did not accept his offer 
to do meth.  (Tr., p. 172, Ls. 7-20.)  While M.M. admittedly testified that Kraly did not 
“hold [her] down and forcefully” inject her with methamphetamine (Tr., p. 281, Ls. 12-
17), she nevertheless testified that Kraly told her “what to do” while he injected her, 
which she complied with.  (Tr., p. 179, Ls. 7-12.)  He also had a “discussion” with M.M. 
about methamphetamine and “how to use it.”  (Tr., p. 181, Ls. 6-12.) 
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Moreover, because M.M. was injected with methamphetamine her regard for the 
situation diminished and she became increasingly heedless of what was happening.  (See 
Tr., p. 180, Ls. 3-25.)  She testified she was aware of her surroundings but because of the 
meth she “didn’t care.”  (Tr., p. 180, Ls. 20-25.)  She testified that she felt “really tired 
and confused,” to which Kraly said “to like trust him and it won’t hurt”—and then 
injected her with the same needle he had just used on himself.  (Tr., p. 182, Ls. 14-23.)  
He continued to inject her as the night went on.  (Tr., p. 187, Ls. 11-25.) 
Thus, unlike the absent or uninvolved adults in Beers, Kraly was altogether 
dominating the situation and controlling M.M.: he was physically present, supervising the 
drug use, and instructing the tired, confused, and first-time meth-using minor to “trust 
him” as he injected her with methamphetamine.  These factors alone would be enough to 
create a duty owed to M.M., and show substantial evidence she was in his custody. 
Kraly asserts as a matter of fact that M.M. “initially refused but later agreed to 
inject some in her anus using a needle-less syringe.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 2.)  However, 
he provides no citation to the record showing that M.M. “agreed” to the initial injection.  
(See Appellant’s brief, p. 2.)1  While M.M. admittedly testified that Kraly did not hold 
her down and forcibly inject her, she also testified that she told him “no,” she did not 
really want to do meth, and did not accept his offer to do meth.  (Tr., p. 172, Ls. 5-20.)  
M.M. also testified that she “just finally said yes” to using methamphetamine after Kraly 
                                            
1 Kraly also mistakenly states that M.M. “could not recall if Mr. Kraly did the injection or 
if she did it herself.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 2 (citing Tr., p. 178, Ls. 7-10).)  This is 
incorrect; the testimony Kraly cites is M.M.’s response that she not recall who lifted her 
skirt up.  (Tr., p. 178, Ls. 5-10.)  M.M. consistently testified that it was Kraly who 
injected her with methamphetamine.  (See, e.g., Tr., p. 177, Ls. 22-24; p. 178, Ls. 3-20; p. 
179, Ls. 13-15; p. 179, L. 24 – p. 180, L. 8.) 
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repeatedly asked her to; but she clarified that “he kept … asking” and that “I kind of gave 
up on saying no” and it was “like no wasn’t good enough.”  (Tr., p. 281, L. 22 – p. 282, L. 
4.)  Construing the evidence in favor of upholding the jury verdict, “giving up on saying 
no” is far better evidence of resignation and surrender, rather than any “agreement” to be 
injected with methamphetamine.  This testimony further shows the extent to which Kraly 
influenced and exerted control over M.M.’s decisions that evening. 
Furthermore, M.M. also was in Kraly’s custody because Kraly injected her while 
she was inside his truck.  Several courts have found that a minor’s presence inside a 
defendant’s vehicle is evidence of custody or control.  For example, in State v. Anspach, 
the defendant drove recklessly with four small children in his truck.  627 N.W.2d at 230.  
The defendant argued, among other things, that “he did not have the right of control over 
the children” and therefore “cannot be guilty of child endangerment.”  Id. at 234. 
The Iowa Supreme Court disagreed, noting first that the statute there specifically 
applied to persons having “custody or control over a child.[2]”  Id. at 231.  To exert 
“control,” as defined by the court, was “[t]o exercise authority or dominating influence.”  
Id. at 234.  Applying that definition, the court concluded whatever control the children’s 
 
                                            
2 Unlike Idaho’s statute, the Iowa child endangerment statute distinguishes between 
individuals with “custody or control” over a minor child.  Iowa Code § 726.6 (emphasis 
added).  Accordingly, the Anspach Court contrasted “custody” and “control”: “[A]n 
individual could have ‘control’ over a child without also having ordinary custody of a 
child. ‘Control’ only refers to the state of having restricting or governing power over 
someone, while ‘custody’ implicates not only a power of oversight but also a 
responsibility for the care of an individual. Therefore, the reach of section 726.6 is 
broader than section 726.3 [which just talks about custody].”  Anspach, 627 N.W.2d at 
234 (quoting State v. Johnson, 528 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Iowa 1995)). 
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guardians initially had, “was surrendered to [defendant] when they placed the children in 
his truck cab, got in the truck bed, and allowed him to drive.”  Id.  As the driver, the 
defendant “was the only one in charge of the situation at this time; [the guardians] were in 
no position to prevent his actions.”  Id.  Moreover, the defendant had control “over the 
instrumentality contributing to the risk to the children in the truck,” insofar as he was the 
driver of the truck.  Id. at 235.  The court thus concluded the defendant “was in control of 
his actions and the consequences of his driving,” and therefore he “had control over the 
children in the truck as required by the statute.”  Id.; see also State v. Friend, 630 N.W.2d 
843 (Iowa 2001) (where defendant “was not charged with overseeing his nephew’s 
welfare while in Iowa,” but “was in control of the truck immediately before the officer 
stopped it,” and therefore, “he was also in ‘control’ of his nephew for purposes” of the 
child endangerment statute). 
Likewise, in Snow v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 537 S.E.2d 6 (Va. App. 2000), 
an defendant transporting his juvenile nephews was found to have custody over them, 
because “[h]e knew that the father was detained in police custody when he voluntarily 
took control of the vehicle and drove away knowing that the juveniles were in the 
vehicle.”  537 S.E.2d at 10.  The Snow Court held “on these facts, appellant was a 
‘person responsible for the care’ of the juvenile occupants of the motor vehicle.’”  Id. 
(holding that “we find that one may become a person ‘responsible for the care of a child’ 
by a voluntary course of conduct and without explicit parental delegation of supervisory 
responsibility or court order”). 
Here, M.M. was similarly under Kraly’s control, and therefore in his custody, 
while inside his truck. Kraly had no “explicit delegation of parental authority” from 
-- --- --- ---------
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M.M.’s father to take her out of school and drive her to the casino.  (Id.; see Tr., p. 194, 
L. 22 – p. 195, L. 16.)  Kraly, as the driver, had the ability to determine where to drive 
and when to do it.  Like the minor passengers in Anspach, Friend, and Snow, M.M. was 
plainly in Kraly’s custody insofar as she was physically inside the vehicle he was in 
control of, and being transported by him.  When Kraly injected M.M. with 
methamphetamine, while she was still inside his truck, she was in his custody. 
Construing the facts and inferences to uphold the jury’s verdict, there was 
sufficient evidence that M.M. was in Kraly’s custody when he injected her with 
methamphetamine; both in her bedroom, and in his truck.  Consequently, there was 




 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of conviction. 
 DATED this 23rd day of  January, 2018. 
 
       
 /s/ Kale D. Gans____________ 
 KALE D. GANS 
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